WWorld Markets

Labor Markov chain — weekly Bayesian flows

Three labor force states — Employed (E), Unemployed (U), Not in labor force (N) — with a Dirichlet–Multinomial conjugate update applied each week to gross flow counts from national labor force surveys (US BLS CPS, UK ONS LFS, Statistics Canada LFS, Destatis Mikrozensus, INSEE Enquête emploi, Japan LFS, ABS LFS).

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Upload or paste weekly gross flows in any of three shapes — the parser auto-detects. Long: week_start, from_state, to_state, count. Wide (matrix): week_start, EE, EU, EN, UE, UU, UN, NE, NU, NN. Row-oriented: week_start, from, E, U, N (one row per from-state). States are E / U / N. Dates accept YYYY-MM-DD, common locale formats, or Excel serials. .xlsx / .xls / .ods files are supported directly.

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Model

Each row of the 3×3 transition matrix P has an independent Dirichlet prior. The number of people transitioning from state i to j in week k is multinomial.

(1)
(2)
(3)

Initial prior: uniform Dirichlet(1,1,1) for each origin row. Each weekly posterior becomes the next week's prior — fully recursive Bayesian filtering.

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Determinants & multinomial-logit regression

9 cells × covariate vectors

We model each origin row of P as a multinomial logit so that the nine transition probabilities sum to one within each row. Let be the probability that a worker in country c moves from state i to state j in week t. With the diagonal element as the reference category:

(4)
(5)

are country fixed effects; are time (seasonal × business-cycle) effects; is the cell-specific covariate vector listed in the tables below. Each cell's equation is (4) evaluated with its own covariate set.

Cell-by-cell determinants & equations

For each of the nine transitions we list the determinants , their data source, the sign predicted by labor-market theory, and the regression equation. Diagonal cells (EE, UU, NN) are the reference categories within their row — their probability is recovered from the constraint that row probabilities sum to one.

EE (EmployedEmployed)
Job retention (EE)Probability an employed worker remains employed next week (baseline / reference category in the multinomial logit).
7 determinants
(6)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = GDP_gReal GDP growth (QoQ, ann.)BEA / Eurostat / OECD QNA+Pro-cyclical demand for labor reduces separations.
x2 = JOLTS_LLayoffs & discharges rateBLS JOLTSDirect measure of involuntary separation flow.
x3 = QQuits rateBLS JOLTS / OECDQuits remove workers from current job (E→E in same firm declines, may go E→E other firm).
x4 = EPLEmployment-protection indexOECD EPL+Higher firing costs raise retention.
x5 = UI_rrUI replacement rateOECD Benefits & WagesHigher UI raises reservation wage and quit incentives.
x6 = K/LCapital deepening / automation indexPenn World Table; IFR robots±Substitutes routine labor; complements skilled labor.
x7 = TTenure (avg. years)CPS tenure supplement+Match-specific capital reduces separation hazard.
EU (EmployedUnemployed)
Separation into unemployment (EU)Job loss followed by active search — the cyclical separation margin.
7 determinants
(7)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = GDP_gReal GDP growthNational accountsProcyclical demand lowers layoffs.
x2 = ΔUUnemployment rate changeBLS / Eurostat+Rising U signals contractionary shock.
x3 = VIXFinancial volatility (VIX / VSTOXX)CBOE / STOXX+Uncertainty raises real-options value of waiting → layoffs.
x4 = OilReal oil-price shockEIA / IMF PCPS+Cost-push shock especially in transport / manufacturing.
x5 = FFRReal short rateFRED / ECB+Tight monetary policy compresses hiring, raises separations with a lag.
x6 = EPLEmployment-protection indexOECDMechanically lowers firings; may raise EN instead.
x7 = TradeImport-penetration shockUN Comtrade / WITS+China-shock literature (Autor-Dorn-Hanson).
EN (EmployedNot in labor force)
Exit out of labor force (EN)Voluntary or discouraged exit — retirement, schooling, caregiving, disability.
6 determinants
(8)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = Age65Share of population 55+UN WPP / Eurostat+Retirement wave from cohort aging.
x2 = DIDisability-insurance generositySSA / OECD SOCX+Higher DI raises hidden-unemployment exits.
x3 = CareChildcare cost (% wage)OECD Family DB+Constrains female participation.
x4 = EduTertiary-enrollment growthUNESCO UIS+Schooling absorbs prime-age workers.
x5 = PensPension wealthOECD Pensions at a Glance+Income effect on labor supply at the extensive margin.
x6 = wReal wage growthBLS CES / Eurostat LCIStrong wages keep workers attached.
UE (UnemployedEmployed)
Job-finding rate (UE)Hazard of exiting unemployment to employment — central job-finding rate f_t.
8 determinants
(9)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = V/UVacancy–unemployment ratio (tightness θ)BLS JOLTS / Eurostat JVS+Matching function: f(θ) increasing in θ.
x2 = GDP_gReal GDP growthNational accounts+Aggregate-demand effect on hiring.
x3 = UI_rrUI replacement rateOECDRaises reservation wage → lowers f.
x4 = UI_dUI potential duration (weeks)DOL ETA / OECDKrueger-Mueller: hazard spikes at exhaustion.
x5 = MismSectoral mismatch indexŞahin-Song-Topa-ViolanteSkill / geographic mismatch shifts Beveridge curve out.
x6 = ALMPActive labor-market spending (% GDP)OECD+Training and PES raise effective search productivity.
x7 = MinWMinimum-wage bite (Kaitz index)BLS / Eurostat±Disemployment vs. monopsony correction.
x8 = DurAvg. unemployment durationCPS / LFSDuration dependence — skill depreciation and stigma.
UU (UnemployedUnemployed)
Persistence in unemployment (UU)Probability of remaining unemployed — reference category in U row.
5 determinants
(10)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = DurMean spell durationCPS / Eurostat+Duration dependence raises persistence.
x2 = MismMismatch indexSSTV+Beveridge-curve outward shift.
x3 = UI_dUI durationDOL ETA+Search intensity falls before exhaustion.
x4 = HystLong-term unemployed shareBLS / Eurostat+Hysteresis (Blanchard-Summers).
x5 = θTightness V/UJOLTSHigher θ raises both UE and UN exits.
UN (UnemployedNot in labor force)
Discouraged exit (UN)Unemployed workers withdrawing from search.
6 determinants
(11)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = DurSpell durationCPS / LFS+Discouragement rises with duration.
x2 = θTightness V/UJOLTS / JVSTight markets keep workers searching.
x3 = UI_exhUI exhaustion shareDOL ETA+Income loss triggers withdrawal.
x4 = Age65Share 55+UN WPP+Older unemployed often retire.
x5 = DIDisability generositySSA+DI absorbs long-term U into N.
x6 = EduRe-enrollment in educationUNESCO / NCES+Retraining moves U→N.
NE (Not in labor forceEmployed)
Direct entry to employment (NE)School-to-work, return from caregiving, retiree un-retirement.
6 determinants
(12)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = θTightness V/UJOLTS+Hot markets pull non-participants in (Hornstein-Kudlyak).
x2 = wReal wage growthCES / LCI+Reservation-wage threshold crossing.
x3 = CareChildcare costOECD Family DBConstrains female entry.
x4 = EITCEITC / in-work benefitsIRS / OECD TaxBEN+Subsidy raises participation (Meyer-Rosenbaum).
x5 = ImmNet migration inflowUN DESA / OECD IMD+New entrants typically begin employed (when work-authorized).
x6 = ALMPActive labor-market spendingOECD+PES converts inactive into hires.
NU (Not in labor forceUnemployed)
Entry as unemployed (NU)Non-participants who begin active job search.
5 determinants
(13)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = θTightness V/UJOLTS+Encouraged-worker effect.
x2 = ΔUHousehold unemployment shockCPS family records+Added-worker effect (Lundberg).
x3 = UI_eligUI eligibility thresholdDOL ETA+Job search activated by benefit eligibility.
x4 = EduGraduating cohort sizeNCES+School-leavers enter U before E.
x5 = ImmNet migrationUN DESA+Entrants often search before placement.
NN (Not in labor forceNot in labor force)
Persistence out of labor force (NN)Reference category in N row — non-participation continuation.
5 determinants
(14)
x_kDeterminantData sourceSignEconomic rationale
x1 = Age65Share 55+UN WPP+Stable retirement state.
x2 = DIDisability generositySSA+Quasi-permanent absorbing state.
x3 = PensPension wealthOECD+Income effect on labor supply.
x4 = θTightness V/UJOLTSTight markets erode non-participation.
x5 = CareChildcare costOECD Family DB+Locks in caregiver inactivity.

Estimation methods

  1. Pooled multinomial logit (MLE). Stack weekly origin–destination counts and maximize
    (15)
    by Newton–Raphson or BFGS. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
  2. Fractional / quasi-binomial GLM. Treat each observed row share as a fraction and estimate by quasi-MLE with a logit link (Papke-Wooldridge). Robust to mis-specification of higher moments.
  3. Bayesian Dirichlet-Multinomial regression. Place priors and sample via Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Stan, PyMC, NumPyro). Posterior predictive draws integrate naturally with the recursive Dirichlet update used on this page.
  4. Panel fixed effects. Include country fixed effects to absorb time-invariant institutional differences (EPL regime, demographic stock) and week fixed effects for global shocks (COVID, GFC).
  5. Endogeneity & IV. Tightness , wages, and UI generosity are jointly determined with flows. Use instruments: Bartik shift-share for local labor demand (Goldsmith-Pinkham-Sorkin-Swift); state-level UI rule changes (Hagedorn-Manovskii-Mitman); monetary-policy surprises (Romer-Romer, Gertler-Karadi). Implement as control function or 2SLS on the logit linear predictor.
  6. Time-varying coefficients. Allow (random-walk state-space) and estimate via Kalman filter / particle filter; this captures structural breaks (Beveridge-curve shifts post-2009, post-2020).
  7. Identification of partial effects. Reported coefficients are log-odds. Average marginal effects on probabilities use
    (16)
    so cross-effects across destinations are non-trivial and must be evaluated at the sample (or counterfactual) means.

Counterfactual prediction workflow

To forecast what happens in country c when an independent variable changes by :

  1. Estimate for all six off-diagonal cells using the equation system above and the full country-week panel.
  2. Build the counterfactual covariate vector .
  3. Compute counterfactual transition probabilities via (5) and assemble the counterfactual matrix .
  4. Iterate the chain on the current state vector :
    (17)
  5. Read off the steady-state employment, unemployment, and participation rates from the left eigenvector of with eigenvalue 1:
    (18)
  6. Compute the steady-state unemployment rate and the participation rate . The change relative to the baseline matrix is the policy / shock impact.
  7. Bootstrap or posterior-sample to obtain credible bands around and LFPR.

Interpretation guide for labor economists

  • Beveridge-curve diagnostics. If falls and rises across the sample, the matching function has deteriorated — Beveridge-curve outward shift.
  • UI design trade-off. Compare the marginal effect of UI generosity on UE (job-finding tax) and on UN (search-retention benefit). Optimal UI (Baily-Chetty) balances liquidity against moral hazard: .
  • Hysteresis test. A persistent positive coefficient on long-term-U share in UU implies true duration dependence rather than dynamic selection.
  • Demographic vs. cyclical decomposition. Demean each covariate by country-time means: cyclical determinants (GDP_g, θ, VIX) drive short-run variation; structural ones (Age65, EPL, DI, Care) drive cross-country level differences.
  • Aggregation back to the published matrix. The estimated logits substitute directly for the Dirichlet posterior means above when forecasting; the Bayesian update remains the natural smoother of the realized counts each week.

Subgroup analysis — age × sex

7 groups

Transition matrices vary sharply by age and sex. The aggregate is a population-weighted mix of group matrices; ignoring composition causes Simpson-style bias when subgroup shares shift (ageing, female participation, youth schooling).

(19)
Age
Sex
Showing Prime-age men 25–54
Prime-age men 25–54 — P
i \ jE (Employed)U (Unemployed)N (Not)
E
0.9750
+1.30pp
0.0120
+0.00pp
0.0130
-1.30pp
U
0.2900
+5.50pp
0.5800
+5.00pp
0.1300
-10.50pp
N
0.0850
+3.90pp
0.0550
+3.10pp
0.8600
-7.00pp
Δ vs. population baseline (16+).
Interpretation

Highest E→E stability; relatively fast U→E reentry; thinnest N margin.

MetricBaseline (16+)Prime-age men 25–54Δ
Steady-state u*5.10%4.43%-0.67pp
Steady-state LFPR*65.63%88.50%+22.87pp
Job-finding U→E23.50%29.00%+5.50pp
Separation E→U1.20%1.20%+0.00pp
Exit E→N2.60%1.30%-1.30pp
Entry N→E4.60%8.50%+3.90pp

Steady-state comparison across all groups

Groupπ_E*π_U*π_N*u*LFPR*U→EE→UE→NN→E
All workers (16+)62.29%3.35%34.37%5.10%65.63%23.50%1.20%2.60%4.60%
Youth men 16–2460.44%7.31%32.25%10.79%67.75%30.00%3.50%6.00%11.00%
Youth women 16–2457.11%5.92%36.97%9.39%63.03%27.50%2.80%6.20%9.50%
Prime-age men 25–5484.58%3.92%11.50%4.43%88.50%29.00%1.20%1.30%8.50%
Prime-age women 25–5469.32%3.16%27.52%4.37%72.48%24.50%1.00%2.50%6.00%
Older men 55+39.97%1.92%58.10%4.59%41.90%18.00%1.00%3.50%2.50%
Older women 55+31.78%1.38%66.84%4.15%33.16%16.50%0.80%3.70%1.80%
Reading the table
  • Youth groups have the lowest E→E and highest churn (E→U, N→E), reflecting school-work transitions and weak job attachment.
  • Prime-age men show the tightest distribution (high π_E*, low π_N*) — they are the canonical "attached" workforce.
  • Prime-age women carry a larger π_N* and higher E→N than prime-age men — driven by care responsibilities and intermittent participation.
  • Older workers exhibit very high N→N (retirement is near-absorbing) and very slow U→E, which lifts long-term unemployment duration.
  • For fairness audits, compare group-specific U→E against the population baseline — gaps signal hiring frictions worth scrubbing.

Subgroup analysis — by profession (SOC 2018)

21 occupations
Monthly cadence

Labor-market flows differ sharply by occupation. Routine-manual and gig-heavy occupations churn faster; skilled trades and healthcare have thicker U→E channels; office and production carry secular automation risk. The whole-economy transition matrix is the employment-weighted mix of individual occupations:

(20)
Whole economy (all professions)
100.0% emp
i \ jEUN
E0.9640.0120.023
U0.2900.5240.186
N0.0620.0320.906
u* 4.63%
LFPR* 75.24%
U→E 29.05%
E→U 1.22%
White-collar aggregate
58.8% emp
i \ jEUN
E0.9750.0080.017
U0.2840.5470.170
N0.0590.0260.915
u* 3.28%
LFPR* 79.37%
U→E 28.37%
E→U 0.84%
Blue-collar aggregate
23.9% emp
i \ jEUN
E0.9580.0180.024
U0.2930.5340.172
N0.0580.0350.907
u* 6.35%
LFPR* 73.50%
U→E 29.33%
E→U 1.79%
Service aggregate
21.9% emp
i \ jEUN
E0.9440.0160.039
U0.3060.4510.244
N0.0760.0420.882
u* 6.17%
LFPR* 69.54%
U→E 30.56%
E→U 1.63%
Collar
Showing Production (manufacturing) (SOC 51)
Production (manufacturing) — P
i \ jE (Employed)U (Unemployed)N (Not)
E
0.9600
-0.45pp
0.0180
+0.58pp
0.0220
-0.13pp
U
0.2750
-1.55pp
0.5600
+3.62pp
0.1650
-2.07pp
N
0.0450
-1.71pp
0.0300
-0.17pp
0.9250
+1.87pp
Interpretation vs. whole economy
Blue-collar

Routine-manual: China-shock and automation exposure raise E→U.

MetricWhole econ.Production (manufacturing)Δ
Steady-state u*4.63%6.69%+2.05pp
Steady-state LFPR*75.24%70.38%-4.86pp
Job-finding U→E29.05%27.50%-1.55pp
Separation E→U1.22%1.80%+0.58pp
Exit E→N2.33%2.20%-0.13pp
Entry N→E6.21%4.50%-1.71pp

Steady-state comparison across all occupations

Occupation (SOC)CollarShareπ_E*π_U*π_N*u*LFPR*U→EE→UE→NN→E
Management (SOC 11)White10.7%83.32%1.63%15.05%1.92%84.95%31.00%0.50%1.10%5.50%
Business & financial ops (SOC 13)White6.2%82.00%2.03%15.97%2.41%84.03%29.50%0.60%1.20%5.50%
Computer & mathematical (SOC 15)White3.8%88.02%1.97%10.01%2.19%89.99%34.00%0.70%0.80%6.50%
Architecture & engineering (SOC 17)White1.9%81.09%2.06%16.85%2.47%83.15%30.00%0.70%1.10%5.00%
Life, physical & social science (SOC 19)White1.0%76.07%2.77%21.16%3.52%78.84%26.00%0.80%1.40%4.50%
Legal (SOC 23)White0.8%78.10%1.87%20.03%2.34%79.97%24.00%0.50%1.10%4.00%
Education, training & library (SOC 25)White5.8%71.69%2.65%25.66%3.57%74.34%22.50%0.80%2.00%5.50%
Arts, design, media & sports (SOC 27)White2.0%67.05%4.18%28.77%5.87%71.23%24.00%1.40%3.10%7.00%
Sales & related (SOC 41)White9.3%70.49%3.68%25.83%4.96%74.17%27.50%1.30%2.70%7.00%
Office & administrative support (SOC 43)White11.1%72.80%3.44%23.76%4.51%76.24%25.50%1.10%1.90%5.50%
Healthcare practitioners (SOC 29)White6.2%80.27%1.56%18.17%1.91%81.83%33.00%0.50%1.50%6.00%
Healthcare support (SOC 31)Service4.5%71.47%3.06%25.47%4.11%74.53%31.00%1.20%2.80%7.50%
Protective service (SOC 33)Service2.3%68.85%2.70%28.45%3.77%71.55%24.00%0.80%2.00%4.50%
Food preparation & serving (SOC 35)Service8.3%64.02%4.98%31.00%7.21%69.00%34.00%2.00%5.00%9.00%
Building & grounds cleaning (SOC 37)Service3.2%62.06%4.51%33.42%6.78%66.58%27.50%1.70%3.80%6.50%
Personal care & service (SOC 39)Service3.6%62.93%4.63%32.44%6.85%67.56%29.00%1.80%4.20%7.50%
Farming, fishing & forestry (SOC 45)Blue0.6%58.04%6.58%35.39%10.18%64.61%31.00%2.80%6.20%9.00%
Construction & extraction (SOC 47)Blue4.5%73.14%5.65%21.21%7.17%78.79%32.00%2.40%2.10%7.00%
Installation, maintenance & repair (SOC 49)Blue3.7%75.50%3.33%21.17%4.23%78.83%28.50%1.10%1.70%5.50%
Production (manufacturing) (SOC 51)Blue6.2%65.68%4.71%29.62%6.69%70.38%27.50%1.80%2.20%4.50%
Transportation & material moving (SOC 53)Blue8.9%67.10%4.45%28.45%6.22%71.55%29.50%1.70%2.80%6.00%
Whole economy (weighted)100.0%71.75%3.49%24.76%4.63%75.24%29.05%1.22%2.33%6.21%
Reading the occupation view
  • White-collar aggregate: high E→E, thin U tail, longer U spells when they happen — reallocation is slower but rarer.
  • Blue-collar aggregate: procyclical E→U (recall / temporary layoffs) and faster U→E via callbacks; construction and farm are most seasonal.
  • Service aggregate: highest churn and largest N margin; food and personal-care carry the heaviest E→N flow.
  • Healthcare (both practitioner and support) is the tightest U→E channel — structural excess demand.
  • Compare each occupation's E→U against the whole-economy weighted baseline — gaps signal automation, offshoring, or demand-side exposure.

Subgroup transition-probability comparison

Side-by-side E/U/N transition probabilities for the whole economy versus white-collar, blue-collar and service aggregates, rescaled to the selected iteration cadence via generator-approximation matrix powers.

base = monthly (SOC 2018)
From E (Employed)
rows sum to 1
From U (Unemployed)
rows sum to 1
From N (Not in labor force)
rows sum to 1
Whole economy
White-collar
Blue-collar
Service
Cadence: Monthly (k = 1.000 monthly steps)
TransitionWhole economyWhite-collarBlue-collarServiceΔ White−BlueΔ Service−Whole
EE96.45%97.47%95.78%94.44%+1.69pp-2.01pp
EU1.22%0.84%1.79%1.63%-0.96pp+0.41pp
EN2.33%1.70%2.43%3.93%-0.73pp+1.59pp
UE29.05%28.37%29.33%30.56%-0.97pp+1.51pp
UU52.38%54.68%53.43%45.06%+1.25pp-7.32pp
UN18.57%16.95%17.23%24.38%-0.28pp+5.80pp
NE6.21%5.85%5.80%7.61%+0.05pp+1.40pp
NU3.17%2.61%3.54%4.24%-0.93pp+1.07pp
NN90.63%91.53%90.66%88.16%+0.88pp-2.47pp
Interpretation (Monthly)
computed from the deltas above
Largest upward deltas
  • UN in Service (+5.80pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
  • EN in Service (+1.59pp vs. whole economy) — more exits from employment out of the labor force
Largest downward deltas
  • UN in White-collar (-1.62pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
  • UN in Blue-collar (-1.34pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
Job-finding, unemployment duration, and churn

A higher means faster job-finding and a shorter mean unemployment spell — expected duration is roughly steps of the selected cadence, so groups sitting above the whole-economy bar (typically healthcare-heavy white-collar and construction/transport blue-collar in recovery) clear their unemployment stock faster. A higher together with a higher — the classic service-sector pattern — signals high churn: workers cycle rapidly between jobs and short unemployment spells rather than staying attached to one employer. Where sits materially above the whole economy, job-finding is weak and long-term unemployment builds up.

Unemployment insurance — level and generosity

More generous UI (higher replacement rate or longer potential duration) raises the reservation wage of the unemployed and lowers the marginal cost of continued search. In the matrix, falls and rises, extending mean unemployment duration (Krueger–Meyer, Chetty 2008; Card–Chetty–Weber 2007). It also mildly reduces because insured workers must keep actively searching to remain eligible, so LFPR holds up. Less generous UI does the opposite: rises (job-finding hazard climbs, spells shorten), but match quality falls and tends to increase as some claimants drop out of active search altogether.

Approaching UI exhaustion LFPR effects

In the weeks right before benefits run out, the job-finding hazard spikes — the well-documented "exhaustion-week bump" (Katz–Meyer 1990; Card–Levine 2000). But a non-trivial share of claimants who do not find work simultaneously exit the labor force: jumps, because once benefits stop the eligibility incentive to keep searching disappears. Some of these exits are absorbed by disability insurance, early retirement, or discouraged-worker status, so measured LFPR falls even as headline unemployment ticks down. The net effect on the labor force is therefore ambiguous in the short run but persistently negative in the medium run — LFPR loss from exhaustion-driven flows is one of the mechanisms behind the post-recession scarring in prime-age participation.

Labor-policy implications & implementations

7 countries
Levers mapped to Markov cells

Each lever below is tagged with the transition cell it moves, the expected sign, and a concrete implementation path. Under the multinomial-logit spec, , so a policy that shifts covariate feeds directly into the counterfactual and the steady-state , .

🇺🇸
United States
US
Markov diagnosis

High U→E job-finding, high E→U separations, elevated N→E from a large hidden-worker pool. Beveridge-curve has shifted outward post-2020; prime-age men participation still below 2000s peak; long-term unemployment share cyclical.

Top priorities
  1. Expand short-time-compensation to raise EE / lower EU
  2. Portable benefits + occupational licensing reform to raise UE
  3. Childcare and DI reform to reactivate N→E

Policy levers

Short-Time Compensation (STC / work-sharing)
EU
Mechanism: Firms cut hours instead of workers → separation rate falls, match capital preserved.
Implementation: Fund state STC administration (DOL grants), auto-enrol employers ≥ 20 FTE, federal cost-share during NBER-dated recessions.
Lead:DOL / state UI agencies
Evidence:Abraham-Houseman (2014); Cahuc-Kramarz-Nevoux (2021).
Universal childcare tax credit + supply subsidy
NE
+
Mechanism: Lowers reservation wage of second earners; raises prime-age female LFPR.
Implementation: Refundable credit up to $6k/child under 5; state block-grants for provider capacity; sliding-scale fees.
Lead:Treasury (IRS), HHS ACF
Evidence:Blau-Kahn (2013); Bick (2016); IMF WP 24/122.
Portable benefits + national licensing reciprocity
UE
+
Mechanism: Removes cross-state / cross-employer frictions; raises job-finding hazard.
Implementation: Federal grants for state licensing compacts (nursing, teaching, IT); pro-rated benefits carried across jobs.
Lead:DOL, state licensing boards
Evidence:Kleiner-Krueger (2013); Johnson-Kleiner (2020).
SSDI vocational rehab expansion (Ticket-to-Work v2)
NU
+
Mechanism: Reduces DI as absorbing state; reactivates non-participants into search.
Implementation: Automatic trial-work protections, benefit offset ($1-for-$2), employer wage subsidy up to 2 years.
Lead:SSA
Evidence:Autor-Duggan (2003, 2010); Maestas-Mullen-Strand (2013).
Wage-insurance for displaced workers
UE
+
Mechanism: Offsets wage loss on reemployment; shortens unemployment spells.
Implementation: 50% wage-gap top-up capped at $10k/yr for 2 years, for workers ≥ 50 in trade-affected sectors.
Lead:DOL (TAA expansion)
Evidence:Kletzer-Litan (2001); Hyman-Kovak-Leive-Naidu (2022).
Implementation sequencing
Year 1: STC + wage insurance (cyclical). Year 2: childcare and DI reform (structural). Year 3: licensing reciprocity via interstate compacts.

Cross-country lever matrix

CountryLeverCellSignLead agency
Short-Time Compensation (STC / work-sharing)EUDOL / state UI agencies
Universal childcare tax credit + supply subsidyNE+Treasury (IRS), HHS ACF
Portable benefits + national licensing reciprocityUE+DOL, state licensing boards
SSDI vocational rehab expansion (Ticket-to-Work v2)NU+SSA
Wage-insurance for displaced workersUE+DOL (TAA expansion)
NHS elective-care backlog fundENDHSC, NHS England
Universal Credit taper reduction (55% → 45%)UE+DWP, HMT
Restart / Work-and-Health Programme expansionUE+DWP
T-Levels and lifetime skills entitlementUUDfE, DLUHC
State-Pension-Age flexible drawdown for 55+NE+DWP, HMT
Foreign Credential Recognition Program expansionUE+ESDC, provincial regulators
EI entrance-requirement floor at 420 hoursEU±ESDC
Canadian Free Trade Agreement — labour-mobility chapter enforcementUE+ISED, provincial ministries
$10/day national childcare buildoutNE+ESDC, provinces
Kurzarbeit permanent standbyEUBundesagentur für Arbeit (BA)
Bürgergeld activation supplementsUE+BMAS, BA Jobcenter
Skilled Immigration Act — recognition fast-trackNE+BMAS, BMI, chambers (IHK/HWK)
Qualifizierungsgeld (Transformation Allowance)EUBA, employer works councils
Full-day Kita legal entitlement (2026)NE+BMFSFJ, Länder
Contrat unique with graduated severanceEUMinistère du Travail
Aide unique à l'apprentissage — permanentNE+France Compétences, DGEFP
Degressive unemployment benefits (Assurance chômage 2019+)UE+Unédic, DARES
France Travail — one-stop PES with intensive coachingUE+France Travail (2024 launch)
Pension reform (age 64) with senior-employment indexENMinistère du Travail
Same-work-same-pay enforcement (Hataraki-kata Kaikaku)UE+MHLW
Labour mobility subsidy (Rōdō Idō Shien Kin)UE+MHLW, METI
M-shaped curve remediation — accredited childcareNE+Cabinet Office, MHLW
Senior-worker continuous-employment obligationENMHLW
Migration Strategy 2023 — Skills-in-Demand visaNE+Department of Home Affairs
Aged-care & early-childhood award wage rise (Fair Work)NE+Fair Work Commission, DoHAC
Fee-Free TAFE — 300k placesUE+DEWR, state training authorities
Workforce Australia — activation redesignUE+DEWR
Paid Parental Leave to 26 weeks (2026)ENDSS, ATO

Levers link to the estimated coefficient set from the country's multinomial-logit fit. To simulate a specific policy quantitatively, translate the intervention into a for the mapped covariate (UI generosity, EPL index, childcare cost, ALMP spending, θ) and iterate the counterfactual chain in the simulator above.

What-if policy simulator

Toggle each policy lever and dial its intensity to see how the country's Markov transition matrix shifts. Deltas are applied as multiplicative log-odds bumps on the mapped cell, then rows are renormalized so probabilities remain valid.

🇺🇸 US
0 levers active
(21)
Short-Time Compensation (STC / work-sharing)
Firms cut hours instead of workers → separation rate falls, match capital preserved.
EU
Δlogit +0.00
Intensity50%
p_ij base
1.35%
p_ij after
1.35%
Δ
+0.00pp
Universal childcare tax credit + supply subsidy
Lowers reservation wage of second earners; raises prime-age female LFPR.
NE
+Δlogit +0.00
Intensity50%
p_ij base
6.21%
p_ij after
6.21%
Δ
+0.00pp
Portable benefits + national licensing reciprocity
Removes cross-state / cross-employer frictions; raises job-finding hazard.
UE
+Δlogit +0.00
Intensity50%
p_ij base
30.72%
p_ij after
30.72%
Δ
+0.00pp
SSDI vocational rehab expansion (Ticket-to-Work v2)
Reduces DI as absorbing state; reactivates non-participants into search.
NU
+Δlogit +0.00
Intensity50%
p_ij base
3.17%
p_ij after
3.17%
Δ
+0.00pp
Wage-insurance for displaced workers
Offsets wage loss on reemployment; shortens unemployment spells.
UE
+Δlogit +0.00
Intensity50%
p_ij base
30.72%
p_ij after
30.72%
Δ
+0.00pp
Baseline P
i \ jEUN
E
0.9632
0.0135
0.0233
U
0.3072
0.5114
0.1813
N
0.0621
0.0317
0.9063
Counterfactual P̃
i \ jEUN
E
0.9632
+0.00pp
0.0135
+0.00pp
0.0233
+0.00pp
U
0.3072
+0.00pp
0.5114
+0.00pp
0.1813
+0.00pp
N
0.0621
+0.00pp
0.0317
+0.00pp
0.9063
+0.00pp
Steady-state stocks
StateBaselineWhat-ifΔ
EEmployed71.68%71.68%+0.00pp
UUnemployed3.58%3.58%+0.00pp
NNot in labor force24.74%24.74%+0.00pp
4.76%4.76%+0.00pp
75.26%75.26%+0.00pp
/ solved as the stationary distribution (500 iter).
Notes and caveats
  • Baselines are the monthly whole-economy transition matrix (SOC-weighted) tilted by a small country-specific offset — Kurzarbeit for DE, lifetime employment for JP, tight θ for AU, etc.
  • Intensity 100% ≈ Δ log-odds of ±0.35 on the mapped cell — an economically large but not extreme policy push. Scale linearly for smaller reforms.
  • Levers signed ± let you flip direction (e.g. welfare-taper cuts can raise or reduce UE depending on design).
  • For a full time-path simulation (weekly / monthly / quarterly cadence), feed these Δ log-odds into the simulator above.

Added Worker Effect — Causality Test

Tano (1993) · Economics Letters

Replicates Tano (1993), "The Added Worker Effect: A Causality Test", Economics Letters 43(1), 111–117. Tests whether the secondary worker's labor-force entry is caused by the primary breadwinner's job loss — as opposed to reverse causation or spurious correlation from a non-stationary common trend.

Data-generating process on synthetic household panel:

AIC chose p = 1 for U → ℓ and p = 1 for ℓ → U. Residual bootstrap under H₀ (500 draws) for robust p-values.

AIC usually selects more lags than BIC; extra lags can raise p-values if the added regressors absorb signal. With B=500, the bootstrap p-value is typically smoother than the asymptotic one; set B=0 to compare the two.

Step 1

Augmented Dickey–Fuller — stationarity prerequisite

Granger causality requires both series to be I(0). H₀: unit root (non-stationary). Reject at 5% if t < −2.86.

Primary unemployment uᵗ

ADF t-statistic-2.411
Critical (5%)-2.86
DecisionFail to reject — unit root

Secondary LFP ℓᵗ

ADF t-statistic-4.576
Critical (5%)-2.86
DecisionReject H₀ — stationary ✓
Panel

Household time-series — uprim and ℓsec

All 400 households (faint), cross-sectional mean (bold), highlighted household #0.

Primary breadwinner unemployment uᵖʳⁱᵐᵢ,ₜ

0.000.170.33t=0t=29t=59Prob. unemployed
householdsmeanhousehold #0

Secondary worker LFP ℓˢᵉᶜᵢ,ₜ

0.000.370.74t=0t=29t=59LFP prob.
householdsmeanhousehold #0

The AWE mechanism is visible when spikes in the left series precede rises in the right for the same household — the lag structure the Granger step formalises.

Step 2

Granger causality — direction of the AWE

Bivariate VAR(1 / 1). Tano's identifying restriction: primary-U Granger-causes secondary-LFP and the reverse does not. Reject H₀ at 5% if p < 0.05.

The selected lag order directly affects these p-values. A higher p soaks up more serial correlation but costs degrees of freedom, which can either strengthen or weaken the F-test depending on whether the additional lags carry genuine signal. AIC usually chooses a longer lag than BIC; if the two criteria disagree, compare the p-values and treat BIC as the more conservative benchmark. Bootstrap p-values are reported below the asymptotic ones when B > 0; they are often more reliable when T is short.

Selected VAR lag order
AIC
uᵖʳⁱᵐ → ℓˢᵉᶜVAR(1)
Chosen by AIC with score -13.0308 (lowest IC among p = 1…8)
ℓˢᵉᶜ → uᵖʳⁱᵐVAR(1)
Chosen by AIC with score -12.5720 (lowest IC among p = 1…8)

H₀: uᵖʳⁱᵐ ⇏ ℓˢᵉᶜ · VAR(1)

F-statistic21.742
df(1, 56)
Asymptotic p1.98e-5
Bootstrap p (B=500)2.00e-3
DecisionReject H₀ — U → LFP ✓

H₀: ℓˢᵉᶜ ⇏ uᵖʳⁱᵐ · VAR(1) — reverse

F-statistic2.135
df(1, 56)
Asymptotic p1.50e-1
Bootstrap p (B=500)1.74e-1
DecisionFail to reject — one-way causality ✓

AIC · U → ℓ

p1:-13.03p2:-12.96p3:-12.91p4:-12.87p5:-12.82p6:-12.78p7:-12.71p8:-12.64

AIC · ℓ → U

p1:-12.57p2:-12.49p3:-12.41p4:-12.34p5:-12.27p6:-12.17p7:-12.11p8:-12.10
Step 3

Hausman specification test — rule out household heterogeneity

Panel regression . Compares within-household fixed-effects to pooled random-effects . Under ( uncorrelated with regressor) both are consistent and RE is efficient; rejecting favors FE — meaning the AWE coefficient is identified within households, not from cross-household selection. The Hausman statistic .

Hausman χ²(1)

β̂_FE (within)0.5431 (SE 0.0056)
β̂_RE (pooled)0.5938 (SE 0.0082)
Hausman statistic25770322.066
p-value0.00e+0
DecisionReject H₀ — FE preferred; identification is within-household ✓

Verdict: causal identification incomplete

At least one condition failed. Increase θ, lower reverse contamination, or grow N/T until all three tests align. Tano notes in the paper that borderline U.S. samples require ≥40 quarters to identify the effect cleanly.

Reference: Tano, D. K. (1993). "The Added Worker Effect: A Causality Test." Economics Letters, 43(1), 111–117.

Includes ADF, Granger, Hausman, bootstrap p-values and configuration.