Labor Markov chain — weekly Bayesian flows
Three labor force states — Employed (E), Unemployed (U), Not in labor force (N) — with a Dirichlet–Multinomial conjugate update applied each week to gross flow counts from national labor force surveys (US BLS CPS, UK ONS LFS, Statistics Canada LFS, Destatis Mikrozensus, INSEE Enquête emploi, Japan LFS, ABS LFS).
Add a country from CSV
Upload or paste weekly gross flows in any of three shapes — the parser auto-detects. Long: week_start, from_state, to_state, count. Wide (matrix): week_start, EE, EU, EN, UE, UU, UN, NE, NU, NN. Row-oriented: week_start, from, E, U, N (one row per from-state). States are E / U / N. Dates accept YYYY-MM-DD, common locale formats, or Excel serials. .xlsx / .xls / .ods files are supported directly.
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Model
Each row of the 3×3 transition matrix P has an independent Dirichlet prior. The number of people transitioning from state i to j in week k is multinomial.
Initial prior: uniform Dirichlet(1,1,1) for each origin row. Each weekly posterior becomes the next week's prior — fully recursive Bayesian filtering.
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Determinants & multinomial-logit regression
We model each origin row of P as a multinomial logit so that the nine transition probabilities sum to one within each row. Let be the probability that a worker in country c moves from state i to state j in week t. With the diagonal element as the reference category:
are country fixed effects; are time (seasonal × business-cycle) effects; is the cell-specific covariate vector listed in the tables below. Each cell's equation is (4) evaluated with its own covariate set.
Cell-by-cell determinants & equations
For each of the nine transitions we list the determinants , their data source, the sign predicted by labor-market theory, and the regression equation. Diagonal cells (EE, UU, NN) are the reference categories within their row — their probability is recovered from the constraint that row probabilities sum to one.
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = GDP_g | Real GDP growth (QoQ, ann.) | BEA / Eurostat / OECD QNA | + | Pro-cyclical demand for labor reduces separations. |
| x2 = JOLTS_L | Layoffs & discharges rate | BLS JOLTS | − | Direct measure of involuntary separation flow. |
| x3 = Q | Quits rate | BLS JOLTS / OECD | − | Quits remove workers from current job (E→E in same firm declines, may go E→E other firm). |
| x4 = EPL | Employment-protection index | OECD EPL | + | Higher firing costs raise retention. |
| x5 = UI_rr | UI replacement rate | OECD Benefits & Wages | − | Higher UI raises reservation wage and quit incentives. |
| x6 = K/L | Capital deepening / automation index | Penn World Table; IFR robots | ± | Substitutes routine labor; complements skilled labor. |
| x7 = T | Tenure (avg. years) | CPS tenure supplement | + | Match-specific capital reduces separation hazard. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = GDP_g | Real GDP growth | National accounts | − | Procyclical demand lowers layoffs. |
| x2 = ΔU | Unemployment rate change | BLS / Eurostat | + | Rising U signals contractionary shock. |
| x3 = VIX | Financial volatility (VIX / VSTOXX) | CBOE / STOXX | + | Uncertainty raises real-options value of waiting → layoffs. |
| x4 = Oil | Real oil-price shock | EIA / IMF PCPS | + | Cost-push shock especially in transport / manufacturing. |
| x5 = FFR | Real short rate | FRED / ECB | + | Tight monetary policy compresses hiring, raises separations with a lag. |
| x6 = EPL | Employment-protection index | OECD | − | Mechanically lowers firings; may raise EN instead. |
| x7 = Trade | Import-penetration shock | UN Comtrade / WITS | + | China-shock literature (Autor-Dorn-Hanson). |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = Age65 | Share of population 55+ | UN WPP / Eurostat | + | Retirement wave from cohort aging. |
| x2 = DI | Disability-insurance generosity | SSA / OECD SOCX | + | Higher DI raises hidden-unemployment exits. |
| x3 = Care | Childcare cost (% wage) | OECD Family DB | + | Constrains female participation. |
| x4 = Edu | Tertiary-enrollment growth | UNESCO UIS | + | Schooling absorbs prime-age workers. |
| x5 = Pens | Pension wealth | OECD Pensions at a Glance | + | Income effect on labor supply at the extensive margin. |
| x6 = w | Real wage growth | BLS CES / Eurostat LCI | − | Strong wages keep workers attached. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = V/U | Vacancy–unemployment ratio (tightness θ) | BLS JOLTS / Eurostat JVS | + | Matching function: f(θ) increasing in θ. |
| x2 = GDP_g | Real GDP growth | National accounts | + | Aggregate-demand effect on hiring. |
| x3 = UI_rr | UI replacement rate | OECD | − | Raises reservation wage → lowers f. |
| x4 = UI_d | UI potential duration (weeks) | DOL ETA / OECD | − | Krueger-Mueller: hazard spikes at exhaustion. |
| x5 = Mism | Sectoral mismatch index | Şahin-Song-Topa-Violante | − | Skill / geographic mismatch shifts Beveridge curve out. |
| x6 = ALMP | Active labor-market spending (% GDP) | OECD | + | Training and PES raise effective search productivity. |
| x7 = MinW | Minimum-wage bite (Kaitz index) | BLS / Eurostat | ± | Disemployment vs. monopsony correction. |
| x8 = Dur | Avg. unemployment duration | CPS / LFS | − | Duration dependence — skill depreciation and stigma. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = Dur | Mean spell duration | CPS / Eurostat | + | Duration dependence raises persistence. |
| x2 = Mism | Mismatch index | SSTV | + | Beveridge-curve outward shift. |
| x3 = UI_d | UI duration | DOL ETA | + | Search intensity falls before exhaustion. |
| x4 = Hyst | Long-term unemployed share | BLS / Eurostat | + | Hysteresis (Blanchard-Summers). |
| x5 = θ | Tightness V/U | JOLTS | − | Higher θ raises both UE and UN exits. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = Dur | Spell duration | CPS / LFS | + | Discouragement rises with duration. |
| x2 = θ | Tightness V/U | JOLTS / JVS | − | Tight markets keep workers searching. |
| x3 = UI_exh | UI exhaustion share | DOL ETA | + | Income loss triggers withdrawal. |
| x4 = Age65 | Share 55+ | UN WPP | + | Older unemployed often retire. |
| x5 = DI | Disability generosity | SSA | + | DI absorbs long-term U into N. |
| x6 = Edu | Re-enrollment in education | UNESCO / NCES | + | Retraining moves U→N. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = θ | Tightness V/U | JOLTS | + | Hot markets pull non-participants in (Hornstein-Kudlyak). |
| x2 = w | Real wage growth | CES / LCI | + | Reservation-wage threshold crossing. |
| x3 = Care | Childcare cost | OECD Family DB | − | Constrains female entry. |
| x4 = EITC | EITC / in-work benefits | IRS / OECD TaxBEN | + | Subsidy raises participation (Meyer-Rosenbaum). |
| x5 = Imm | Net migration inflow | UN DESA / OECD IMD | + | New entrants typically begin employed (when work-authorized). |
| x6 = ALMP | Active labor-market spending | OECD | + | PES converts inactive into hires. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = θ | Tightness V/U | JOLTS | + | Encouraged-worker effect. |
| x2 = ΔU | Household unemployment shock | CPS family records | + | Added-worker effect (Lundberg). |
| x3 = UI_elig | UI eligibility threshold | DOL ETA | + | Job search activated by benefit eligibility. |
| x4 = Edu | Graduating cohort size | NCES | + | School-leavers enter U before E. |
| x5 = Imm | Net migration | UN DESA | + | Entrants often search before placement. |
| x_k | Determinant | Data source | Sign | Economic rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| x1 = Age65 | Share 55+ | UN WPP | + | Stable retirement state. |
| x2 = DI | Disability generosity | SSA | + | Quasi-permanent absorbing state. |
| x3 = Pens | Pension wealth | OECD | + | Income effect on labor supply. |
| x4 = θ | Tightness V/U | JOLTS | − | Tight markets erode non-participation. |
| x5 = Care | Childcare cost | OECD Family DB | + | Locks in caregiver inactivity. |
Estimation methods
- Pooled multinomial logit (MLE). Stack weekly origin–destination counts and maximizeby Newton–Raphson or BFGS. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.(15)
- Fractional / quasi-binomial GLM. Treat each observed row share as a fraction and estimate by quasi-MLE with a logit link (Papke-Wooldridge). Robust to mis-specification of higher moments.
- Bayesian Dirichlet-Multinomial regression. Place priors and sample via Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (Stan, PyMC, NumPyro). Posterior predictive draws integrate naturally with the recursive Dirichlet update used on this page.
- Panel fixed effects. Include country fixed effects to absorb time-invariant institutional differences (EPL regime, demographic stock) and week fixed effects for global shocks (COVID, GFC).
- Endogeneity & IV. Tightness , wages, and UI generosity are jointly determined with flows. Use instruments: Bartik shift-share for local labor demand (Goldsmith-Pinkham-Sorkin-Swift); state-level UI rule changes (Hagedorn-Manovskii-Mitman); monetary-policy surprises (Romer-Romer, Gertler-Karadi). Implement as control function or 2SLS on the logit linear predictor.
- Time-varying coefficients. Allow (random-walk state-space) and estimate via Kalman filter / particle filter; this captures structural breaks (Beveridge-curve shifts post-2009, post-2020).
- Identification of partial effects. Reported coefficients are log-odds. Average marginal effects on probabilities useso cross-effects across destinations are non-trivial and must be evaluated at the sample (or counterfactual) means.(16)
Counterfactual prediction workflow
To forecast what happens in country c when an independent variable changes by :
- Estimate for all six off-diagonal cells using the equation system above and the full country-week panel.
- Build the counterfactual covariate vector .
- Compute counterfactual transition probabilities via (5) and assemble the counterfactual matrix .
- Iterate the chain on the current state vector :(17)
- Read off the steady-state employment, unemployment, and participation rates from the left eigenvector of with eigenvalue 1:(18)
- Compute the steady-state unemployment rate and the participation rate . The change relative to the baseline matrix is the policy / shock impact.
- Bootstrap or posterior-sample to obtain credible bands around and LFPR.
Interpretation guide for labor economists
- Beveridge-curve diagnostics. If falls and rises across the sample, the matching function has deteriorated — Beveridge-curve outward shift.
- UI design trade-off. Compare the marginal effect of UI generosity on UE (job-finding tax) and on UN (search-retention benefit). Optimal UI (Baily-Chetty) balances liquidity against moral hazard: .
- Hysteresis test. A persistent positive coefficient on long-term-U share in UU implies true duration dependence rather than dynamic selection.
- Demographic vs. cyclical decomposition. Demean each covariate by country-time means: cyclical determinants (GDP_g, θ, VIX) drive short-run variation; structural ones (Age65, EPL, DI, Care) drive cross-country level differences.
- Aggregation back to the published matrix. The estimated logits substitute directly for the Dirichlet posterior means above when forecasting; the Bayesian update remains the natural smoother of the realized counts each week.
Subgroup analysis — age × sex
Transition matrices vary sharply by age and sex. The aggregate is a population-weighted mix of group matrices; ignoring composition causes Simpson-style bias when subgroup shares shift (ageing, female participation, youth schooling).
| i \ j | E (Employed) | U (Unemployed) | N (Not) |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.9750 +1.30pp | 0.0120 +0.00pp | 0.0130 -1.30pp |
| U | 0.2900 +5.50pp | 0.5800 +5.00pp | 0.1300 -10.50pp |
| N | 0.0850 +3.90pp | 0.0550 +3.10pp | 0.8600 -7.00pp |
Highest E→E stability; relatively fast U→E reentry; thinnest N margin.
| Metric | Baseline (16+) | Prime-age men 25–54 | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steady-state u* | 5.10% | 4.43% | -0.67pp |
| Steady-state LFPR* | 65.63% | 88.50% | +22.87pp |
| Job-finding U→E | 23.50% | 29.00% | +5.50pp |
| Separation E→U | 1.20% | 1.20% | +0.00pp |
| Exit E→N | 2.60% | 1.30% | -1.30pp |
| Entry N→E | 4.60% | 8.50% | +3.90pp |
Steady-state comparison across all groups
| Group | π_E* | π_U* | π_N* | u* | LFPR* | U→E | E→U | E→N | N→E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All workers (16+) | 62.29% | 3.35% | 34.37% | 5.10% | 65.63% | 23.50% | 1.20% | 2.60% | 4.60% |
| Youth men 16–24 | 60.44% | 7.31% | 32.25% | 10.79% | 67.75% | 30.00% | 3.50% | 6.00% | 11.00% |
| Youth women 16–24 | 57.11% | 5.92% | 36.97% | 9.39% | 63.03% | 27.50% | 2.80% | 6.20% | 9.50% |
| Prime-age men 25–54 | 84.58% | 3.92% | 11.50% | 4.43% | 88.50% | 29.00% | 1.20% | 1.30% | 8.50% |
| Prime-age women 25–54 | 69.32% | 3.16% | 27.52% | 4.37% | 72.48% | 24.50% | 1.00% | 2.50% | 6.00% |
| Older men 55+ | 39.97% | 1.92% | 58.10% | 4.59% | 41.90% | 18.00% | 1.00% | 3.50% | 2.50% |
| Older women 55+ | 31.78% | 1.38% | 66.84% | 4.15% | 33.16% | 16.50% | 0.80% | 3.70% | 1.80% |
- Youth groups have the lowest E→E and highest churn (E→U, N→E), reflecting school-work transitions and weak job attachment.
- Prime-age men show the tightest distribution (high π_E*, low π_N*) — they are the canonical "attached" workforce.
- Prime-age women carry a larger π_N* and higher E→N than prime-age men — driven by care responsibilities and intermittent participation.
- Older workers exhibit very high N→N (retirement is near-absorbing) and very slow U→E, which lifts long-term unemployment duration.
- For fairness audits, compare group-specific U→E against the population baseline — gaps signal hiring frictions worth scrubbing.
Subgroup analysis — by profession (SOC 2018)
Labor-market flows differ sharply by occupation. Routine-manual and gig-heavy occupations churn faster; skilled trades and healthcare have thicker U→E channels; office and production carry secular automation risk. The whole-economy transition matrix is the employment-weighted mix of individual occupations:
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.964 | 0.012 | 0.023 |
| U | 0.290 | 0.524 | 0.186 |
| N | 0.062 | 0.032 | 0.906 |
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.975 | 0.008 | 0.017 |
| U | 0.284 | 0.547 | 0.170 |
| N | 0.059 | 0.026 | 0.915 |
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.958 | 0.018 | 0.024 |
| U | 0.293 | 0.534 | 0.172 |
| N | 0.058 | 0.035 | 0.907 |
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.944 | 0.016 | 0.039 |
| U | 0.306 | 0.451 | 0.244 |
| N | 0.076 | 0.042 | 0.882 |
| i \ j | E (Employed) | U (Unemployed) | N (Not) |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.9600 -0.45pp | 0.0180 +0.58pp | 0.0220 -0.13pp |
| U | 0.2750 -1.55pp | 0.5600 +3.62pp | 0.1650 -2.07pp |
| N | 0.0450 -1.71pp | 0.0300 -0.17pp | 0.9250 +1.87pp |
Routine-manual: China-shock and automation exposure raise E→U.
| Metric | Whole econ. | Production (manufacturing) | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steady-state u* | 4.63% | 6.69% | +2.05pp |
| Steady-state LFPR* | 75.24% | 70.38% | -4.86pp |
| Job-finding U→E | 29.05% | 27.50% | -1.55pp |
| Separation E→U | 1.22% | 1.80% | +0.58pp |
| Exit E→N | 2.33% | 2.20% | -0.13pp |
| Entry N→E | 6.21% | 4.50% | -1.71pp |
Steady-state comparison across all occupations
| Occupation (SOC) | Collar | Share | π_E* | π_U* | π_N* | u* | LFPR* | U→E | E→U | E→N | N→E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Management (SOC 11) | White | 10.7% | 83.32% | 1.63% | 15.05% | 1.92% | 84.95% | 31.00% | 0.50% | 1.10% | 5.50% |
| Business & financial ops (SOC 13) | White | 6.2% | 82.00% | 2.03% | 15.97% | 2.41% | 84.03% | 29.50% | 0.60% | 1.20% | 5.50% |
| Computer & mathematical (SOC 15) | White | 3.8% | 88.02% | 1.97% | 10.01% | 2.19% | 89.99% | 34.00% | 0.70% | 0.80% | 6.50% |
| Architecture & engineering (SOC 17) | White | 1.9% | 81.09% | 2.06% | 16.85% | 2.47% | 83.15% | 30.00% | 0.70% | 1.10% | 5.00% |
| Life, physical & social science (SOC 19) | White | 1.0% | 76.07% | 2.77% | 21.16% | 3.52% | 78.84% | 26.00% | 0.80% | 1.40% | 4.50% |
| Legal (SOC 23) | White | 0.8% | 78.10% | 1.87% | 20.03% | 2.34% | 79.97% | 24.00% | 0.50% | 1.10% | 4.00% |
| Education, training & library (SOC 25) | White | 5.8% | 71.69% | 2.65% | 25.66% | 3.57% | 74.34% | 22.50% | 0.80% | 2.00% | 5.50% |
| Arts, design, media & sports (SOC 27) | White | 2.0% | 67.05% | 4.18% | 28.77% | 5.87% | 71.23% | 24.00% | 1.40% | 3.10% | 7.00% |
| Sales & related (SOC 41) | White | 9.3% | 70.49% | 3.68% | 25.83% | 4.96% | 74.17% | 27.50% | 1.30% | 2.70% | 7.00% |
| Office & administrative support (SOC 43) | White | 11.1% | 72.80% | 3.44% | 23.76% | 4.51% | 76.24% | 25.50% | 1.10% | 1.90% | 5.50% |
| Healthcare practitioners (SOC 29) | White | 6.2% | 80.27% | 1.56% | 18.17% | 1.91% | 81.83% | 33.00% | 0.50% | 1.50% | 6.00% |
| Healthcare support (SOC 31) | Service | 4.5% | 71.47% | 3.06% | 25.47% | 4.11% | 74.53% | 31.00% | 1.20% | 2.80% | 7.50% |
| Protective service (SOC 33) | Service | 2.3% | 68.85% | 2.70% | 28.45% | 3.77% | 71.55% | 24.00% | 0.80% | 2.00% | 4.50% |
| Food preparation & serving (SOC 35) | Service | 8.3% | 64.02% | 4.98% | 31.00% | 7.21% | 69.00% | 34.00% | 2.00% | 5.00% | 9.00% |
| Building & grounds cleaning (SOC 37) | Service | 3.2% | 62.06% | 4.51% | 33.42% | 6.78% | 66.58% | 27.50% | 1.70% | 3.80% | 6.50% |
| Personal care & service (SOC 39) | Service | 3.6% | 62.93% | 4.63% | 32.44% | 6.85% | 67.56% | 29.00% | 1.80% | 4.20% | 7.50% |
| Farming, fishing & forestry (SOC 45) | Blue | 0.6% | 58.04% | 6.58% | 35.39% | 10.18% | 64.61% | 31.00% | 2.80% | 6.20% | 9.00% |
| Construction & extraction (SOC 47) | Blue | 4.5% | 73.14% | 5.65% | 21.21% | 7.17% | 78.79% | 32.00% | 2.40% | 2.10% | 7.00% |
| Installation, maintenance & repair (SOC 49) | Blue | 3.7% | 75.50% | 3.33% | 21.17% | 4.23% | 78.83% | 28.50% | 1.10% | 1.70% | 5.50% |
| Production (manufacturing) (SOC 51) | Blue | 6.2% | 65.68% | 4.71% | 29.62% | 6.69% | 70.38% | 27.50% | 1.80% | 2.20% | 4.50% |
| Transportation & material moving (SOC 53) | Blue | 8.9% | 67.10% | 4.45% | 28.45% | 6.22% | 71.55% | 29.50% | 1.70% | 2.80% | 6.00% |
| Whole economy (weighted) | — | 100.0% | 71.75% | 3.49% | 24.76% | 4.63% | 75.24% | 29.05% | 1.22% | 2.33% | 6.21% |
- White-collar aggregate: high E→E, thin U tail, longer U spells when they happen — reallocation is slower but rarer.
- Blue-collar aggregate: procyclical E→U (recall / temporary layoffs) and faster U→E via callbacks; construction and farm are most seasonal.
- Service aggregate: highest churn and largest N margin; food and personal-care carry the heaviest E→N flow.
- Healthcare (both practitioner and support) is the tightest U→E channel — structural excess demand.
- Compare each occupation's E→U against the whole-economy weighted baseline — gaps signal automation, offshoring, or demand-side exposure.
Subgroup transition-probability comparison
Side-by-side E/U/N transition probabilities for the whole economy versus white-collar, blue-collar and service aggregates, rescaled to the selected iteration cadence via generator-approximation matrix powers.
| Transition | Whole economy | White-collar | Blue-collar | Service | Δ White−Blue | Δ Service−Whole |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E→E | 96.45% | 97.47% | 95.78% | 94.44% | +1.69pp | -2.01pp |
| E→U | 1.22% | 0.84% | 1.79% | 1.63% | -0.96pp | +0.41pp |
| E→N | 2.33% | 1.70% | 2.43% | 3.93% | -0.73pp | +1.59pp |
| U→E | 29.05% | 28.37% | 29.33% | 30.56% | -0.97pp | +1.51pp |
| U→U | 52.38% | 54.68% | 53.43% | 45.06% | +1.25pp | -7.32pp |
| U→N | 18.57% | 16.95% | 17.23% | 24.38% | -0.28pp | +5.80pp |
| N→E | 6.21% | 5.85% | 5.80% | 7.61% | +0.05pp | +1.40pp |
| N→U | 3.17% | 2.61% | 3.54% | 4.24% | -0.93pp | +1.07pp |
| N→N | 90.63% | 91.53% | 90.66% | 88.16% | +0.88pp | -2.47pp |
- U→N in Service (+5.80pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
- E→N in Service (+1.59pp vs. whole economy) — more exits from employment out of the labor force
- U→N in White-collar (-1.62pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
- U→N in Blue-collar (-1.34pp vs. whole economy) — more discouraged-worker exits from search
A higher means faster job-finding and a shorter mean unemployment spell — expected duration is roughly steps of the selected cadence, so groups sitting above the whole-economy bar (typically healthcare-heavy white-collar and construction/transport blue-collar in recovery) clear their unemployment stock faster. A higher together with a higher — the classic service-sector pattern — signals high churn: workers cycle rapidly between jobs and short unemployment spells rather than staying attached to one employer. Where sits materially above the whole economy, job-finding is weak and long-term unemployment builds up.
More generous UI (higher replacement rate or longer potential duration) raises the reservation wage of the unemployed and lowers the marginal cost of continued search. In the matrix, falls and rises, extending mean unemployment duration (Krueger–Meyer, Chetty 2008; Card–Chetty–Weber 2007). It also mildly reduces because insured workers must keep actively searching to remain eligible, so LFPR holds up. Less generous UI does the opposite: rises (job-finding hazard climbs, spells shorten), but match quality falls and tends to increase as some claimants drop out of active search altogether.
In the weeks right before benefits run out, the job-finding hazard spikes — the well-documented "exhaustion-week bump" (Katz–Meyer 1990; Card–Levine 2000). But a non-trivial share of claimants who do not find work simultaneously exit the labor force: jumps, because once benefits stop the eligibility incentive to keep searching disappears. Some of these exits are absorbed by disability insurance, early retirement, or discouraged-worker status, so measured LFPR falls even as headline unemployment ticks down. The net effect on the labor force is therefore ambiguous in the short run but persistently negative in the medium run — LFPR loss from exhaustion-driven flows is one of the mechanisms behind the post-recession scarring in prime-age participation.
Labor-policy implications & implementations
Each lever below is tagged with the transition cell it moves, the expected sign, and a concrete implementation path. Under the multinomial-logit spec, , so a policy that shifts covariate feeds directly into the counterfactual and the steady-state , .
High U→E job-finding, high E→U separations, elevated N→E from a large hidden-worker pool. Beveridge-curve has shifted outward post-2020; prime-age men participation still below 2000s peak; long-term unemployment share cyclical.
- Expand short-time-compensation to raise EE / lower EU
- Portable benefits + occupational licensing reform to raise UE
- Childcare and DI reform to reactivate N→E
Policy levers
Cross-country lever matrix
| Country | Lever | Cell | Sign | Lead agency |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Short-Time Compensation (STC / work-sharing) | EU | − | DOL / state UI agencies | |
| Universal childcare tax credit + supply subsidy | NE | + | Treasury (IRS), HHS ACF | |
| Portable benefits + national licensing reciprocity | UE | + | DOL, state licensing boards | |
| SSDI vocational rehab expansion (Ticket-to-Work v2) | NU | + | SSA | |
| Wage-insurance for displaced workers | UE | + | DOL (TAA expansion) | |
| NHS elective-care backlog fund | EN | − | DHSC, NHS England | |
| Universal Credit taper reduction (55% → 45%) | UE | + | DWP, HMT | |
| Restart / Work-and-Health Programme expansion | UE | + | DWP | |
| T-Levels and lifetime skills entitlement | UU | − | DfE, DLUHC | |
| State-Pension-Age flexible drawdown for 55+ | NE | + | DWP, HMT | |
| Foreign Credential Recognition Program expansion | UE | + | ESDC, provincial regulators | |
| EI entrance-requirement floor at 420 hours | EU | ± | ESDC | |
| Canadian Free Trade Agreement — labour-mobility chapter enforcement | UE | + | ISED, provincial ministries | |
| $10/day national childcare buildout | NE | + | ESDC, provinces | |
| Kurzarbeit permanent standby | EU | − | Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) | |
| Bürgergeld activation supplements | UE | + | BMAS, BA Jobcenter | |
| Skilled Immigration Act — recognition fast-track | NE | + | BMAS, BMI, chambers (IHK/HWK) | |
| Qualifizierungsgeld (Transformation Allowance) | EU | − | BA, employer works councils | |
| Full-day Kita legal entitlement (2026) | NE | + | BMFSFJ, Länder | |
| Contrat unique with graduated severance | EU | − | Ministère du Travail | |
| Aide unique à l'apprentissage — permanent | NE | + | France Compétences, DGEFP | |
| Degressive unemployment benefits (Assurance chômage 2019+) | UE | + | Unédic, DARES | |
| France Travail — one-stop PES with intensive coaching | UE | + | France Travail (2024 launch) | |
| Pension reform (age 64) with senior-employment index | EN | − | Ministère du Travail | |
| Same-work-same-pay enforcement (Hataraki-kata Kaikaku) | UE | + | MHLW | |
| Labour mobility subsidy (Rōdō Idō Shien Kin) | UE | + | MHLW, METI | |
| M-shaped curve remediation — accredited childcare | NE | + | Cabinet Office, MHLW | |
| Senior-worker continuous-employment obligation | EN | − | MHLW | |
| Migration Strategy 2023 — Skills-in-Demand visa | NE | + | Department of Home Affairs | |
| Aged-care & early-childhood award wage rise (Fair Work) | NE | + | Fair Work Commission, DoHAC | |
| Fee-Free TAFE — 300k places | UE | + | DEWR, state training authorities | |
| Workforce Australia — activation redesign | UE | + | DEWR | |
| Paid Parental Leave to 26 weeks (2026) | EN | − | DSS, ATO |
Levers link to the estimated coefficient set from the country's multinomial-logit fit. To simulate a specific policy quantitatively, translate the intervention into a for the mapped covariate (UI generosity, EPL index, childcare cost, ALMP spending, θ) and iterate the counterfactual chain in the simulator above.
What-if policy simulator
Toggle each policy lever and dial its intensity to see how the country's Markov transition matrix shifts. Deltas are applied as multiplicative log-odds bumps on the mapped cell, then rows are renormalized so probabilities remain valid.
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.9632 | 0.0135 | 0.0233 |
| U | 0.3072 | 0.5114 | 0.1813 |
| N | 0.0621 | 0.0317 | 0.9063 |
| i \ j | E | U | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| E | 0.9632 +0.00pp | 0.0135 +0.00pp | 0.0233 +0.00pp |
| U | 0.3072 +0.00pp | 0.5114 +0.00pp | 0.1813 +0.00pp |
| N | 0.0621 +0.00pp | 0.0317 +0.00pp | 0.9063 +0.00pp |
| State | Baseline | What-if | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| EEmployed | 71.68% | 71.68% | +0.00pp |
| UUnemployed | 3.58% | 3.58% | +0.00pp |
| NNot in labor force | 24.74% | 24.74% | +0.00pp |
| 4.76% | 4.76% | +0.00pp | |
| 75.26% | 75.26% | +0.00pp |
- Baselines are the monthly whole-economy transition matrix (SOC-weighted) tilted by a small country-specific offset — Kurzarbeit for DE, lifetime employment for JP, tight θ for AU, etc.
- Intensity 100% ≈ Δ log-odds of ±0.35 on the mapped cell — an economically large but not extreme policy push. Scale linearly for smaller reforms.
- Levers signed ± let you flip direction (e.g. welfare-taper cuts can raise or reduce UE depending on design).
- For a full time-path simulation (weekly / monthly / quarterly cadence), feed these Δ log-odds into the simulator above.
Added Worker Effect — Causality Test
Replicates Tano (1993), "The Added Worker Effect: A Causality Test", Economics Letters 43(1), 111–117. Tests whether the secondary worker's labor-force entry is caused by the primary breadwinner's job loss — as opposed to reverse causation or spurious correlation from a non-stationary common trend.
AIC chose p = 1 for U → ℓ and p = 1 for ℓ → U. Residual bootstrap under H₀ (500 draws) for robust p-values.
AIC usually selects more lags than BIC; extra lags can raise p-values if the added regressors absorb signal. With B=500, the bootstrap p-value is typically smoother than the asymptotic one; set B=0 to compare the two.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller — stationarity prerequisite
Granger causality requires both series to be I(0). H₀: unit root (non-stationary). Reject at 5% if t < −2.86.
Primary unemployment uᵗ
| ADF t-statistic | -2.411 |
| Critical (5%) | -2.86 |
| Decision | Fail to reject — unit root |
Secondary LFP ℓᵗ
| ADF t-statistic | -4.576 |
| Critical (5%) | -2.86 |
| Decision | Reject H₀ — stationary ✓ |
Household time-series — uprim and ℓsec
All 400 households (faint), cross-sectional mean (bold), highlighted household #0.Primary breadwinner unemployment uᵖʳⁱᵐᵢ,ₜ
Secondary worker LFP ℓˢᵉᶜᵢ,ₜ
The AWE mechanism is visible when spikes in the left series precede rises in the right for the same household — the lag structure the Granger step formalises.
Granger causality — direction of the AWE
Bivariate VAR(1 / 1). Tano's identifying restriction: primary-U Granger-causes secondary-LFP and the reverse does not. Reject H₀ at 5% if p < 0.05.
The selected lag order directly affects these p-values. A higher p soaks up more serial correlation but costs degrees of freedom, which can either strengthen or weaken the F-test depending on whether the additional lags carry genuine signal. AIC usually chooses a longer lag than BIC; if the two criteria disagree, compare the p-values and treat BIC as the more conservative benchmark. Bootstrap p-values are reported below the asymptotic ones when B > 0; they are often more reliable when T is short.
H₀: uᵖʳⁱᵐ ⇏ ℓˢᵉᶜ · VAR(1)
| F-statistic | 21.742 |
| df | (1, 56) |
| Asymptotic p | 1.98e-5 |
| Bootstrap p (B=500) | 2.00e-3 |
| Decision | Reject H₀ — U → LFP ✓ |
H₀: ℓˢᵉᶜ ⇏ uᵖʳⁱᵐ · VAR(1) — reverse
| F-statistic | 2.135 |
| df | (1, 56) |
| Asymptotic p | 1.50e-1 |
| Bootstrap p (B=500) | 1.74e-1 |
| Decision | Fail to reject — one-way causality ✓ |
AIC · U → ℓ
AIC · ℓ → U
Hausman specification test — rule out household heterogeneity
Panel regression . Compares within-household fixed-effects to pooled random-effects . Under ( uncorrelated with regressor) both are consistent and RE is efficient; rejecting favors FE — meaning the AWE coefficient is identified within households, not from cross-household selection. The Hausman statistic .
Hausman χ²(1)
| β̂_FE (within) | 0.5431 (SE 0.0056) |
| β̂_RE (pooled) | 0.5938 (SE 0.0082) |
| Hausman statistic | 25770322.066 |
| p-value | 0.00e+0 |
| Decision | Reject H₀ — FE preferred; identification is within-household ✓ |
Verdict: causal identification incomplete
At least one condition failed. Increase θ, lower reverse contamination, or grow N/T until all three tests align. Tano notes in the paper that borderline U.S. samples require ≥40 quarters to identify the effect cleanly.
Reference: Tano, D. K. (1993). "The Added Worker Effect: A Causality Test." Economics Letters, 43(1), 111–117.